Primary navigation:

QFINANCE Quick Links
QFINANCE Topics
QFINANCE Reference

Home > Contributor Biographies > Richard A. Werner

Contributor Biographies

Richard A. Werner

Chair, University of Southampton, UK
Richard A. WernerRichard A. Werner

Richard Werner began his academic career as a fellow at the Institute of Economics and Statistics, University of Oxford, in 1992. From 1997 to 2004 he was assistant professor at Sophia University, Tokyo. Since 2004 he has been at the University of Southampton Management School, where he is Chair in International Banking and founding director of the Centre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development. Werner has more than 20 years of financial sector experience, including as chief economist at Jardine Fleming Securities (Asia), as senior portfolio manager of a major US asset management firm, and as senior consultant, visiting researcher, or visiting scholar at a number of Japanese financial institutions and government departments including the Bank of Japan. He was an early advocate of an expansion in bank credit creation—which he dubbed “quantitative easing” in 1995 in Japan—as a suitable policy to resolve banking instability without using taxpayers’ money. In 2003 the World Economic Forum designated him a “Global leader of tomorrow.”


Articles by this Author

  • Understanding and Forecasting the Credit Cycle—Why the Mainstream Paradigm in Economics and Finance Collapsed
    by Richard A. Werner
    Professor Richard A. Werner, DPhil (Oxon), BSc (Economics, LSE), began his academic career as Marie Curie Fellow of the European Commission at the University of Oxford. From 1997 to 2004 he was Assistant Professor at Sophia University, Tokyo. Since 2004 he has been at the University of Southampton, School of Management, where he is Chair in International Banking and founding director of the Centre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable...
  • Lessons from the 2008 Financial Crisis—Part I: Banking Policy
    by Richard A. Werner
    On the surface, the events leading up to the financial crisis of 2007–2008 began with the widespread mis-selling of financial instruments, especially those related to bets on different parcels of US mortgage debt. Despite the very high ratings which these structured credit derivatives were given by credit rating agencies Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, they were actually highly risky, and hence grossly mispriced and overvalued. As investors...
  • Lessons From the 2008 Financial Crisis—Part II: Central Banks and Monetary Reform
    by Richard A. Werner
    Part I of this contribution discussed the causes of the financial crisis of 2008, and how any country can quickly end banking crises and post-crisis recessions, as well as how one can avoid the recurring banking crises in the first place. As was seen, the prescriptions are not difficult to implement. This raises the question of why such policies have not been implemented in most countries. I also pointed out that banking crises are predictable,...

Back to top

Share this page

  • Facebook
  • Twitter
  • LinkedIn
  • Bookmark and Share